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Remarks on the International Legal Character 
of the Paris Agreement* 
JACOB WERKSMAN†
I. INTRODUCTION
 These informal remarks on the legal character of the Paris 
Agreement were made in February 2016, only a few months after the 
Agreement was adopted by acclamation by the representatives of 
more than 190 countries.1  Governments sped to ratify the 
Agreement, triggering its entry into international legal force on 
November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption.2  The wide 
support of the international community for the Paris Agreement was 
forged through many compromises, including on the Agreement’s 
legal character.3  As will be described, a number of the compromises 
that weakened the Agreement’s legal character were made, in part, to 
© 2019 Jacob Werksman 
* This Article is based on the third 2016 ‘Environmental Law Brodies Lecture’
delivered by the author on February 9th, 2016, shortly after the Paris Agreement was 
adopted. It has been brought up to date in light of more recent developments. The Brodies 
lecture is held every year at the University of Edinburgh in association with Brodies LLP. 
        † Jacob Werksman is Principal Advisor, Directorate General for Climate Action, 
European Commission and was a Lead Negotiator for the European Union during the Paris 
Agreement negotiations. The lecture was delivered in his personal capacity and reflects his 
own views. These views are informed by his professional involvement in the climate change 
negotiations, on and off, since 1991, representing a range of governments and NGOs, 
beginning as a legal advisor to the Alliance of Small Island States, working with various 
European governments. 
1. Status of Treaties: 7.d Paris Agreement, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties
.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7d&chapter=27&clang= 
_en (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
2. Id.
3. Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142 (2016). 
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accommodate U.S. domestic politics.4  Knowing that the consent of a 
Republican-controlled Senate for a new international treaty on 
climate change was unlikely, the Obama Administration worked to 
craft an agreement that the executive branch could join under its 
authority alone.5  In September 2016, the United States joined the 
Paris Agreement by Executive Order.6  On June 1, 2017, under a new 
administration, the United States announced its intent, through the 
exercise of executive authority alone, to withdraw from the 
Agreement.7  Unless the Administration reverses its decision, U.S. 
withdrawal will become effective November 4, 2020, the day after 
the U.S. Presidential elections.8 
After briefly describing the Agreement’s essential features, I 
turn to the issue of its legal character, describing for whom, how, and 
why this issue became such a key aspect of the Paris negotiations.9  I 
describe what I understand to be the dimensions of legal character, 
and how the Paris Agreement can be tested against these 
dimensions.10  I then focus specifically on the provisions at the heart 
of the Paris Agreement that describe each Party’s commitment to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.11  A deal was reached on these 
provisions by preserving two distinctions: firstly, the distinction 
between the legal form of the Agreement and the legal character of 
these provisions; and secondly the distinction between obligations of 
conduct and obligations of result. 
Since its adoption, the international legal character of the Paris 
Agreement has continued to be the subject of academic debate—
particularly in the United States—with many concluding that it is an 
 
 4.  See infra Section V.  
 5.  See infra Section VII(B). 
 6.  Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters Paris 
Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Sept. 3, 2016), https://obamawh 
itehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-
agreement.  
 7.  Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal From the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 373 (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-
president-trump-paris-climate-accord/. 
 8.  Chris Mooney, Trump Can’t Actually Exit the Paris Deal Until the Day After the 
2020 Election. That’s a Big Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.washin 
gtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/12/heres-what-election-means-us-withdrawal-
paris-climate-deal/?utm_term=.99ee26f9c89a; see also G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, art. 28, Paris 
Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf 
[hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
 9.  See infra Section IV.  
 10.  See infra Section VI. 
 11.  See infra Section VII. 
WERKSMAN  
2019]INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 345 
internationally legally binding treaty, with a mixture of “top-down” 
binding elements and “bottom-up” flexibility that leaves much to the 
discretion of its Parties.12  In the three years since the Agreement was 
adopted, its Parties have concluded negotiations on the “Paris 
Rulebook” —a set of decisions that provide detailed guidance on how 
the Agreement will be implemented.13  These remarks will not 
address the relationship between the Rulebook and the Agreement’s 
legal character, but in my view, by setting out how Parties will report 
regularly on their emissions and how they will track progress toward 
implementing and achieving their targets, the Rulebook will 
strengthen the Agreement’s normative force. 
II. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
The Paris Agreement sets ambitious long term goals by 
clarifying the temperature and emissions limits associated with a 
stable climate system.14  It aims to hold global average temperature 
rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit this 
rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.15  To achieve these goals, its Parties aim 
to reach a global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible, and climate neutral emissions—a balance of emissions from 
sources and removals by sinks—in the second half of this century.16  
To this end, the Agreement will catalyze domestic climate 
policies and policymaking processes, through a requirement that each 
of its Parties prepare, communicate, and regularly update an 
emissions reduction target (“nationally determined contributions”— 
 
 12.  Daniel Bodansky notes that the debate over the legal character of the Paris 
Agreement has continued—particularly among US academics—even after the Agreement 
was adopted and entered into force. Bodansky, supra note 3. He summarizes the source of 
the debate as confusion about the different characteristics of legal form. Id. He concludes 
that the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the deﬁnition of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, but not every provision of the agreement creates a legal obligation. Id. It 
contains a mix of mandatory and nonmandatory provisions. Id. The debate clearly has 
additional political and legal dimensions in the US, where even supporters of the Agreement 
consistently refer to it as the “Paris Accord” in an apparent effort to support the Obama 
Administration’s decision to ratify the Agreement by executive authority rather than through 
the treaty approval powers of the US Senate. Id. 
 13.  Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 
December, UNFCCC (Mar. 19, 2019), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018 
_3%28report%29_advance.pdf. 
 14.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2(1)(a).  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. arts. 2(1)(a), 4(1). 
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or NDC)17 every five years.  The Agreement also puts in place a 
mandatory and robust transparency and accountability system to track 
each Party’s implementation and achievement of its NDC.18  
Further, the Agreement calls for continued financial and 
technical support to poor and vulnerable countries, both to cut their 
emissions, as well as to prepare for the impacts of climate change.19  
It creates a new paradigm for climate governance through a 
contemporary understanding of how to share common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities between 
richer and poorer countries.  The Agreement leaves behind the 
outdated definitions of developed and developing countries that were 
agreed to in 1992, and that had divided climate politics for decades.   
Under Paris, each Party determines for itself the level of ambition it 
considers a fair contribution to achieving the Agreement’s goals.20 
III. LEGAL CHARACTER OVER THREE DECADES OF CLIMATE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
The legal character of the Paris Agreement became an obsession 
for climate negotiators.  This needs to be understood in the context of 
the treaties and other decisions that came before Paris.  The Paris 
Agreement is the third internationally legally binding treaty on 
climate change negotiated since the early 1990s.  The first is the 1992 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty 
that sets out basic principles, institutions, and procedures for 
reporting on emissions and policies, but no clear targets or timetables 
for reducing emissions.21  The UNFCCC establishes the regime’s 
governing body—the Conference of the Parties (COP).22  The second 
treaty, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, contains legally 
binding emissions budgets (2008-2012); internationally authorized 
 
 17.  Id. arts. 4(2), 4(9), 14. 
 18.  Id. arts. 13(1), 13(2), 13(6), 13(7)(b). 
 19.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(5).  
 20.  Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris 
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, ¶ 27. 
While the terms “developed” and “developing” are used throughout the Paris Agreement, 
these are undefined, and many of the Agreement’s main commitments are applicable to all 
Parties. There are strong political expectations that those countries classified as developed in 
1992 continue to take the lead under the Agreement by fulfilling the developed country 
commitments to provide climate finance (Article 9(1)) and to maintain economy-wide 
emissions reduction targets (Article 4(4)). See Paris Agreement, supra note 14.  
 21.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 4, 
1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].  
 22.  Id. ¶ 7.   
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carbon markets and a compliance system authorized to impose 
binding sanctions—but its substantive obligations apply only to those 
industrialized countries—primarily the European Union and its 
Member States—that agreed to join and remain within its 
constraints.23   
An effort to draw the rest of the world’s emitters into a new 
legally binding treaty failed spectacularly at the 2009 COP in 
Copenhagen.24  This led to a period of experimentation between 
2012-2020 with a two track system—the developed country Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol were persuaded to negotiate a second 
commitment period of binding targets, while the rest of the world 
would participate through a system of voluntary “pledges” and 
review set up by non-binding COP decisions under the Convention.25   
The design of the post-2020 regime began in earnest at the 
Durban COP in 2011.  The “Durban mandate,” which set the terms of 
reference for the negotiation of what became the Paris Agreement 
established “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument 
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention 
applicable to all Parties.”26  This language allowed sufficient 
ambiguity for the negotiations to move ahead with the support of the 
European Union and other progressive Parties, which favored a treaty 
with binding targets based on the Kyoto Protocol;27 countries like 
India, which preferred an outcome based on COP decisions, like the  
 
 
 
 
 
 23.  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162; see also Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts, 
CNN (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/kyoto-protocol-fast-facts/ 
indx.html. 
 24.  Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit, BBC (Dec. 19, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8421935.stm; John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals 
Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2009), https://www.thegua 
rdian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal.  
 25.  Jacob Werksman, Q&A: The Legal Character and Legitimacy of the Cancun 
Agreements, WORLD RESOURCES INSTIT. (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.wri.org/blog/2010/12/ 
qa-legal-character-and-legitimacy-cancun-agreements. 
 26.  Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban 
from 28 November to 11 December 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, at 2 
[hereinafter Durban Mandate].  
 27.  Nuno S. Lacasta et al., Consensus Among Many Voices: Articulating the European 
Union’s Position on Climate Change, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 400 (2002).  
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existing system of “pledge and review;”28 and those like the United 
States, which were looking for an indeterminate something in 
between.29  
In the midst of the Durban mandate, at the Warsaw COP in 
2013, Parties returned to the issue of legal character when deciding 
whether the emissions reduction targets in the Agreement, would be 
characterized as “commitments” (a word which to many implied a 
binding form) or "contributions" (a word chosen because it was 
devoid of meaning).30  While characterized as an outcome that did 
not “prejudge” the legal character of a final deal, agreeing to use the 
term “nationally determined contributions” at this stage of the 
negotiations very likely weakened the prospects that the legal 
character of the targets would be binding and strengthened the 
prospects that the form of the Agreement would be binding.  
In 2015, in the weeks before the Paris COP, the debate and 
confusion around legal character flared up again.  The press fanned 
some flames between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and French 
Minister Laurent Fabius (who would brilliantly chair the Paris COP) 
lit by a mischaracterization in a Financial Times headline that read 
“Paris Climate Deal Will Not Be A Legally Binding Treaty.”31  What 
Sec. Kerry had in fact said, as reported in the body of the article, was 
that there were “not going to be legally binding reduction targets like 
Kyoto.”32  He was referring not to the legal form of the Agreement, 
but rather to the targets (“contributions”) that would be contained 
within the agreement.33  
Even the final moments of the Paris negotiations were marked 
by controversy over legal character.  In the final plenary of the COP, 
the French COP presidency presented the Parties with a compromise, 
 
 28.  MINISTRY OF ENV’T AND FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, CLIMATE CHANGE 
NEGOTIATIONS: INDIA’S SUBMISSIONS TO THE UNFCCC 29–31 (2009), http://www.moef 
.nic.in/downloads/public-information/UNFCCC_final.pdf; see also, Armin Rosencranz et al., 
Climate Change Adaption, Measures, and Policies in India, 22 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 
575.  
 29.  Jason Obold et al., Impressions from Durban: COP-17 and Current Climate 
Change Policies, 23 COLO. J. OF INT’L. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 389, 394–96 (2012). 
 30.  Fiona Harvey, As the Warsaw Climate Talks End, the Hard Work is Just Beginning, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/25/ 
warsaw-climate-talks-end-cop19-2015. 
 31.  Demetri Sevastopulo & Pilita Clark, Paris Climate Deal Will Not Be a Legally 
Binding Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79daf872-8894-
11e5-90de-f44762bf9896.html#axzz3zTw0Re5w. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
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to the surprise of many.  It had substituted the word “should” in a 
previous draft with the word “shall” in a provision describing the 
expectation that developed countries undertake economy-wide 
absolute emissions reduction targets as their NDCs.34  The United 
States objected on the basis of legal form and on differentiations 
between developed and developing countries.35  With the COP 
Presidency taking responsibility for what it described as a clerical 
“error,” the UNFCCC Secretariat reinstated the word “should” 
alongside other largely cosmetic adjustments to the text.36  The 
incident was allowed to pass and the Paris Agreement, with one more 
“should” and one fewer “shall,” was adopted by acclamation.37 
IV. WHY DOES LEGAL CHARACTER MATTER?  
Why did the European Union and other Parties care so much 
about the legal character of the Paris Agreement?  In essence, 
advocates for “a legally binding agreement” believe that a binding 
agreement is more likely to affect state behavior, as well as the 
behavior of other actors.38  A binding agreement is the highest form 
of the expression of the political will of its Parties and of the political 
priority of the issues it addresses.39  It is an expression of the Parties’ 
intent to be bound and an indication that others can act in reliance on 
that intent.40  
Internationally, the legally binding character of an agreement 
provides the foundation for institution building, including the 
legislative functions of the COP and the legal personality of its 
Secretariat.  Internationally, robust legal agreements often bring with 
them the institutions and procedures for transparency and 
accountability appropriate to any serious contract between Parties.41 
The legal character of an international agreement can catalyze other 
international agreements and institutions in an important way.  For 
 
 34.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(4).  
 35.  Yong-Xiang Zhang et al., The Withdrawal of the U.S. From the Paris Agreement 
and Its Impact on Global Climate Change Governance, 8 KEAI 213, 215 (2017). 
 36.  See generally John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal, 
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/ 
16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Daniel Bodansky, Legally Binding Versus Non-Legally Binding Instruments, in 
TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME, 155 (Scott Barrett, Carlo 
Carraro, & Jaime de Melo eds., 2015). 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 162. 
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example, international trade agreements increasingly contain 
commitments that promote the implementation of international  
environmental treaties,42 and the World Bank environmental 
safeguards relate to environmental treaties to which host countries are 
bound.43 
The international legal character of the regime helps mobilize 
the highest level of participation by governments, the private sector 
and the media.  The Paris COP would not have broken records (i.e., 
the number of heads of state and government, as well as mayors, and 
CEOs in attendance; the public and private sector financial resources 
mobilized; the international headlines captured)44 had the Paris COP 
not been a treaty-based body, negotiating a new treaty.  
Domestically, internationally binding agreements more often 
engage parliaments in their ratification, leading to the codification or 
strengthening of domestic implementation laws and regulations.45  If 
properly ratified by more than one branch of government, such 
agreements can better survive changes in political cycles.46  They 
provide a higher profile focus for domestic stakeholders and 
constituencies, and may be justiciable in national courts or otherwise 
actionable.47  
 
        In the course of four years of negotiations, from Durban to Paris, 
this view in favor of a legally binding agreement was challenged—as 
naïve, positivist, and even dangerous—by both delegations and 
academics.48  Some argued, for example, that, in the absence of 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Gerda van Roozendaal, The Inclusion of Environmental Concerns in US 
Trade Agreements, 18(3) ENVTL. POL. 431, 431–38 (2009). 
 43.  Among the Operational Principles that are to inform a World Bank Environment 
Assessment include assessing “the adequacy of the applicable legal and institutional 
framework, including applicable international environmental agreements, and confirm that 
they provide that the cooperating government does not finance project activities that would 
contravene such international obligations.” Table A1 – Environmental and Social Safeguard 
Policies—Policy Objectives and Operational Principles, WORLD BANK (July 2005), 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Environmental%20and%20social%
20safeguard%20policie.pdf. 
 44.  The Paris COP21 Climate Summit in Numbers, LOCAL FRANCE (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://www.thelocal.fr/20151130/cop-21-in-numbers-the-facts-and-figures-to-know.  
 45.  Bodansky, supra note 38, at 161 (“[T]reaties must be formally ratified by states, 
usually with the approval of the legislature. So acceptance of a treaty generally signals 
greater domestic buy-in and commitment than acceptance of a political agreement, which 
typically can be done by the executive acting alone.”). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. (noting that international tribunals and domestic courts can apply legal 
obligations). 
 48.  Steve Herz, Paris Climate Deal Needs to be Politically, Not Legally Binding, 
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enforcement mechanisms, a legally binding agreement was no more 
likely to change state behavior than a non-binding instrument.49  
Others argued that while bindingness might be a worthwhile 
characteristic, in this circumstance it could discourage participation, 
or even lower ambition.50  
The famously binding Kyoto Protocol was offered as an 
example of a treaty that had both scared Parties away and failed to 
react when its Parties didn’t comply or withdrew.51  Proponents of a 
legally binding agreement argued in response that the Kyoto Protocol 
failed not because of its legal form, but because of the unwillingness 
of the United States and other major economies to act on climate 
change.52  In other words, with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, there 
was a misalignment from the outset between the depth of key Parties' 
political will and the design of the agreement.  
V. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES BEHIND THE DEBATE OVER LEGAL 
CHARACTER 
The debate over the legal character of the Paris Agreement can 
be seen from three political perspectives:  
First, that of major developing country economies and middle-
income countries that had never before undertaken binding 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases.  Among these countries, 
India, which has grown to become one of the world's largest emitters 
of greenhouse gases, still has more than 300 million people living off 
the grid.53  These countries wanted to avoid signing up to binding 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS (July 26, 2017), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/07/26/ 
paris-climate-deal-needs-politically-not-legally-binding/.  
 49.  Id. (“Most legal analysts, climate negotiators, and other close observers of the 
process have taken the position that the agreement itself makes emission reduction pledges 
essentially voluntary, since countries have free rein to set their own targets and policies and 
are not required to meet the targets they put forward.”). 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Brad Plumer, Stay in or Leave the Paris Climate Deal? Lessons from Kyoto, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/climate/paris-climate-agreeme 
nt-kyoto-protocol.html.  
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Vanita Awasthi & Rohit Kumar Gupta, COP 21: THE PARIS PARADIGM, INT’L 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES (Dec. 2016), https://ijlss.wordpress.com/2016/12  
/21/cop-21-the-paris-paradigm-by-vanita-awasthi-rohit-kumar-gupta-volume/  
(“India’s priority is economic growth and the eradication of poverty. A fifth of its population 
does not have access to electricity, so electrification is a priority for the country. Indian 
government agencies are preparing plans for domestic climate action, but these would only 
slow the growth of carbon emissions.”). 
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commitments that could compromise their development priorities.54  
They were accustomed to signing up to climate agreements that had 
binding obligations for richer countries, but not for them, and 
continued to see this as a dimension of “equity” and a reflection of 
“historical responsibility.”55 
Second, as has been described, the Obama Administration was 
keen to shape and join the Paris Agreement but faced constitutional 
and political constraints.56  The United States made it clear that it 
could not join if the form of the Agreement would require the advice 
and consent of a Republican dominated and historically reluctant 
Senate.57  But it is fair to say that during the negotiations, the 
boundaries of the President's Executive Authority to bind the state 
were not well-understood.  Finding a way to understand and 
accommodate these concerns without gutting the agreement occupied 
a lot of time.  Politically, the United States could not sign onto an 
agreement that held it, as a developed country, party to a higher 
standard of “bindingness” than developing countries, particularly 
China.58  The European Union, and the rest of the industrialized 
countries, shared this political constraint.  
Third, the European Union and other progressive countries were 
pushing for higher ambition and saw a binding legal character as a 
key aspect of ambition.59  For the European Union, this was also 
about raising its competitors up to the same standards to which it had 
been held under the Kyoto Protocol.60  For small islands, this was an 
“existential issue”—they needed confidence that the agreement on 
which their survival depended would be as strong as possible.61  
Many governments shared a concern that a deal struck between the  
United States and major emerging economies, each uncomfortable 
with bindingness for different reasons, would lead to a low common 
denominator agreement, including one with a weak legal character.  
 
 54.  Id. at 21. 
 55.  Id. at 22. 
 56.  Raymond Clemencon, The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal 
Failure or Historic Breakthrough, 25 J. ENV’T & DEV. 3, 6 (2016). 
 57.  See generally David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a 
Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power?, LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2016), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climate-change-legitimate-exercise-executive 
-agreement-power. 
 58.  Clemencon, supra note 56, at 5. 
      59. Paris Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N., https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/internation 
al/negotiations/paris_en (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, CLEAN ENERGY FOR ISLANDS INITIATIVE 1 (2018). 
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These differing perspectives on legal character led negotiators to 
explore the design of an internationally legally binding agreement, 
containing provisions with variable legal character.62  Participation in 
a binding treaty could be encouraged by enabling each Party to 
determine nationally the form of target and level of ambition it was 
prepared to bind itself to.  The needle of U.S. constitutional and 
political constraints could be threaded with an agreement containing 
commitments (or rather "contributions") that amount to binding 
obligations of conduct, without being binding as to their result.  A 
high degree of “functional bindingness” could be built into the Paris 
Agreement by ensuring it had the highest standard transparency and 
accountability provisions.  And the legal character of Parties' 
contributions could evolve over time.  Paris has the potential to be 
dramatically more inclusive than both the Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol in terms of the participation of Parties and its coverage of 
global emissions. 
VI. THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 
The legal character of an international agreement can be said to 
have four essential dimensions.  The first is the legal form of the 
Agreement itself.63  This dimension examines whether the Agreement 
is a treaty under international law.64  The second is the mandatory or 
prescriptive nature of the provisions within the Agreement.65  Third, 
the specificity and precision of these provisions: the details of what a  
Party must actually do to abide by the terms of the Agreement.66 
Finally, the rules, procedures, and institutions in place to hold Parties 
accountable for their commitments, and to compel their compliance.67 
 
   
 
 62.  See infra Section VI. 
 63.  Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement: A Primer, OPINIO 
JURIS (Feb. 12, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/02/the-legal-character-of-the-paris-
agreement-a-primer/ (arguing the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the meaning of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); see also infra Section VI(A).  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. (“Often treaties contain a mix of mandatory and hortatory elements … So even 
though the Paris agreement will be a treaty, not every element of it need be legally binding 
on the parties.”). See also infra Section VI(B). 
 66.  Id.; see also infra Section VI(C). 
 67.  Id.  
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A. The Legal Form of the Agreement 
 On its face, the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the meaning 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  As such, it (a) 
requires any country that wishes to be a Party to notify its consent to 
be bound (through ratification, acceptance, approval or accession);68 
(b) allows for no reservations;69 and (c) provides that Parties will 
remain bound unless and until they withdraw.70 
 The Paris Agreement is a “related legal instrument” to the 
UNFCCC, adopted by its COP, and since signed, ratified and brought 
into force by its Parties.71  It is not a "protocol" by name but it is 
legally indistinguishable in its basic legal form from the Kyoto 
Protocol (i.e. it is a treaty), and it meets the only relevant UNFCCC 
rule on the adoption of protocols: the text that led to its adoption was 
circulated to UNFCCC Parties six months before it was adopted.72   
 As a treaty, and consistent with the Durban mandate that set 
the terms of reference for its negotiation, the Paris Agreement is an 
outcome with legal force (based on its form, and as we shall see, its 
content).73  It was characterized by the Obama administration under 
U.S. law as an executive agreement.74  It does not carry the title of a 
"treaty" or "Protocol" due to U.S. constitutional and political 
sensitivities.75 
B. The Mandatory and Specific Nature of the Commitments: or 
"Who is Bound to do What, and by When?"  
  The Paris Agreement contains a variety of guiding provisions. 
Article 2 sets out “the purpose” of the Paris Agreement.76  Within 
that purpose there seems to be multiple “aims,” referred to elsewhere  
 
 
 
 
 
 68.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 20. 
 69.  Id. art. 27. 
 70.  Id. art. 28. 
 71.  UNFCCC, art. 7.2. 
 72.  UNFCCC, art. 17.2. 
 73.  Kayla Clark, The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American 
Jurisprudence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 117–18 (2018). 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2. 
WERKSMAN  
2019]INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 355 
in the Agreement as “goals.”77  There is also a reference to the 
Convention's "objective" as well as a reframing of a couple of the 
Convention's “principles.”78 
          The Agreement contains a range of more specific provisions 
described variably as contributions, efforts, actions, targets, strategies 
and plans.79  These provisions are framed in language that ranges 
from “shall,” “should,” “will,” and “strive.”80  The provisions are 
directed at each Party, at all Parties, at categories of Parties 
(developed, developing, etc.), at institutions, and at no one in 
particular.81  Some obligations are specific, some general, a few are 
indecipherable (these are rare), but a number are sufficiently precise 
and prescriptive to be both mandatory and, presumably, in some 
jurisdictions, justiciable. 
 The core of what each Party will do in substance is nationally 
determined and nationally tailored in terms of its specific and 
prescriptive nature.82  Indeed, some contributions, as designed 
nationally, are conditioned on the actions of other Parties in 
providing support and/or on the performance of their own economies, 
by linking emissions reductions to growth in GDP.83  
          Such a variety in the legal character of different provisions is 
not unusual in international agreements, which often must balance 
multiple issues and priorities.84  However, to a degree, this may be 
unique to the Paris Agreement and to the issue of climate change. 
  The variety of obligations becomes clear when comparing the 
Agreement’s provisions on mitigation, support and adaptation.  While 
Article 3 calls for all Parties to make “nationally determined 
contributions” in each of these areas of climate policy, they are do so 
“as defined” in the relevant articles of the Agreement.85  Article 4 
(discussed in more detail below) addresses mitigation, and contains 
the most Party-specific obligations, applicable to all Parties.86 
 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. art. 2. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2. 
 82.  Lavanya Rajamani & Jutta Brunnee, The Legality of Downgrading Nationally 
Determined Contributions Under the Paris Agreement: Lessons From the US 
Disengagement, 29 OXFORD J. OF INT’L LAW 537, 541 (2017).  
 83.  Id. at 538. 
 84.  Rajamani, supra note 83, at 547. 
 85.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3.  
 86.  Id. art. 4. 
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Articles 9, 10, and 11 describe the more general obligations of 
developed Parties to provide finance, technology, and capacity 
building to developing countries, whereas Article 7, on adaptation, 
has the most general obligation.87  The main reason that individual 
commitments on finance are relatively weak was the unwillingness 
and the constitutional inability of many traditional donors to commit 
in advance, and in a binding way to specific financial targets.  One of 
the reasons the provisions on adaptation are very soft in their legal 
character is because setting baselines and measuring progress on a 
country's “resilience” to climate change is difficult.  The actions 
necessary are not well-understood, and many vulnerable countries 
were reluctant to take on specific commitments that could become 
burdens of implementation, or conditions for accessing funding.  So 
what might appear in the Paris Agreement to be a random pattern of 
legal character, reflects a shared sense that the provisions related to 
mitigation should be the most prescriptive and precise.  
C. Procedures and Institutions for Transparency, Accountability 
and Compliance 
One of the biggest challenges, and perhaps the most important 
accomplishment of the Paris Agreement, was to bridge the divide 
between developed and developing countries through an enhanced 
transparency framework for the measuring, reporting and verification 
of Parties' performance, applicable to all Parties, but with flexibilities 
that take into account differences in national circumstances and 
capacities.88  Each Party will be required to report every two years in 
accordance with agreed methodologies and comment metrics.89  
The transparency framework is also applicable to all the 
Agreement's provisions, but with tailored approaches to accounting 
and/or transparency rules for mitigation, finance, and even for 
adaptation.90  The transparency framework, with regard to mitigation 
and the provision of support, is backed by a three-part accountability 
system: (1) an expert review process with the purpose of "tracking 
progress towards achieving" NDCs, and a mandate to “identify areas 
 
 87.  Id. arts. 7, 9–11. 
 88.  Transparency of support under the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int 
/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/transparency-of-support-ex-post/transparency-of-suppor 
t-under-the-paris-agreement (last visited April 28, 2019). 
 89.  What is the Paris Agreement?, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/proces-and-meetings 
/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
 90.  Transparency of support under the Paris Agreement, supra note 88. 
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of improvement;”91 (2) a multilateral consideration or peer review 
process that will consider each Party's respective “implementation 
and achievement” of its NDC;92 and (3) a mechanism to facilitate 
implementation and compliance with (all provisions) of the 
Agreement, under a Standing Committee of experts that will operate 
in a “facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of 
national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.”93 
Together, these procedures will not only provide an evidence 
base of whether Parties are performing against their commitments, 
but create regular moments of institutionalized political 
accountability for progress made at the international and domestic 
level.  The rules build capacity at the country level to measure and to 
manage emissions.  While there are no “consequences” for non-
compliance identified in the Paris Agreement, the system can evolve 
over time.94  Nonetheless, together these elements add up to one of 
the most robust and comprehensive transparency and accountability 
frameworks of any international environmental agreement.95 
VII. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PARIS AGREEMENT’S EMISSIONS 
REDUCTION TARGETS (NDCS) 
While the Paris Agreement sets out bold long term temperature 
goals and calls for climate neutrality in coming decades, it is Parties’ 
individual NDCs and how well they perform against them that will 
determine whether these ambitious goals are met.  The nationally 
determined nature of the NDCs has led nearly every Party to the Paris 
Agreement to communicate an NDC, with many of them taking on,  
 
 
 
 
 
 91.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 13(5), 13(12). 
 92.  Id. art. 13(11). 
 93.  Id. art. 13(3). 
 94.  Anders Corr, Expect Climate Catastrophe: Paris Agreement Lack Enforcement, 
FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/12/01/expect-climate-
catastrophe-paris-agreement-lacks-enforcement/#1a0987a83313 (“Enforcement mechanisms 
for climate change targets are not being implemented, including in the Paris Agreement of 
December 2015.”). 
 95.  Paris Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/internat 
ional/negotiations/paris_en (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (noting that “[g]overnments agreed to 
… track progress towards the long-term goal through a robust transparency and 
accountability system”). 
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for the first time, a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.96  The 
NDCs are therefore the Agreement's greatest strength—and also, 
potentially, its greatest vulnerability. 
The unique legal character of the NDCs under the Paris 
Agreement is determined by how the mitigation contributions are set 
and anchored in the Paris Agreement, how and where the targets are 
“housed,” and how they are made operational. 
A. How are the mitigation contributions set? 
The content of each mitigation contribution has been nationally 
determined.97  The precision and prescriptiveness of each Party's 
contribution will, in part, determine what that Party is bound to do.  
For most of the 189 Parties to the Paris Agreement, the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) received by the 
Secretariat in the run up to Paris became NDCs when they joined the 
Agreement.98  These documents are remarkably diverse in their form 
and content: from the EU's 10-year carbon target 2021-2030, to the 
US point target for 2025, to China's pledge to peak its CO2 emissions 
"around 2030," to a diverse mix of policies and measures, 
conditioned and unconditional.99 
The Paris Agreement encourages all Parties to move over time 
towards more precise and prescriptive mitigation contributions that 
are economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets.100  It 
includes guidance on how Parties will improve the clarity and 
comparability of their NDCs.101  All Parties are required to account 
for the net emissions and removals corresponding to their  
contributions in a way that “promote[s] environmental integrity, 
transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, and 
consistency.”102 
 
 96.  NDC Registry (interim), UNFCCC, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging 
/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (“[One hundred and eighty-two Parties have 
submitted their first NDCs. [One] Party has submitted their second NDCs.”). 
 97.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(2). 
 98.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Synthesis Rep. by the Secretariat, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2016/2 (May 2, 2016), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/e 
ng/02.pdf. 
 99.  The NDC Platform: A Comprehensive Resource on National Climate Targets and 
Action, WORLD BANK (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange 
/brief/the-ndc-platform-a-comprehensive-resource-on-national-climate-targets-and-action.  
 100.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(4). 
 101.  Id. art. 4(8). 
 102.  Id. art. 4(13). 
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Thus, while nationally determined, the Paris Agreement puts in 
place processes designed to improve the prescriptiveness and 
precision of targets over time.103  While these new rules will not 
apply until the next round of contributions (for most Parties this is 
post 2030), any Party at any time can update its contribution to 
enhance its level of ambition.104 
B. How the Mitigation Contributions Anchored? 
This was the most contentious part of the discussions on legal 
character—how each Party's obligation with regard to its NDC is 
expressed—the textual "anchor."  Here the three perspectives I 
mentioned—the reluctant major emerging economy, the 
constitutionally challenged United States, and the aligned 
progressives—came most sharply into focus. 
While some emerging economies remained cautious about the 
legal character of contributions, their primary concern was to ensure 
they would not be bound in a way that compromised their 
development priorities.105  This concern was largely addressed 
through the nationally determined nature of the contributions. 
The main battle ground, what is now Article 4(2) of the 
Agreement, saw a struggle between the United States and the 
progressives in the context of a rather fluid understanding of U.S. 
constitutional and political constraints.  In order for the United States 
to join the Agreement under the President's Executive authority, 
negotiators came to understand the Agreement would need to meet a 
three-part test: 
It would have to fall within the general foreign policy 
powers of the President as set out in the U.S. 
Constitution; 
 
It could not commit the United States to international 
obligations beyond the scope of those necessary to 
implement the UNFCCC, which the Senate had 
already ratified; and 
 
 103.  What is the Paris Agreement?, supra note 93.  
 104.  Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris 
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, ¶¶ 31–32. 
 105.  Matthew Dalton & Gabriele Steinhauser, Compromises Make Global Climate Deal 
More Possible, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/developing-
nations-hesitant-to-embrace-global-warming-limits-1449768622 (noting that priority of the 
developing-nation group is fighting poverty rather than cutting greenhouse-gas emissions). 
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Its implementation would need to be consistent with 
authorities the Executive had already been granted by 
Congress under existing legislation.106 
No one could claim to fully understand these boundaries as 
applied to these particular negotiations.  But the Obama 
Administration was clearly keen to provide the United States with a 
comfortable legal buffer, in a context where there were limited 
analogous precedents and even less jurisprudence. 
It was understood that the U.S. President can, through an 
Executive Agreement, enter into an international legally binding 
agreement and that the Paris Agreement was emerging as one that 
would be seen as in furtherance of the implementation of the 
UNFCCC, which the Senate had already ratified.107  But the President 
could not bind the United States internationally to achieving a 
specific target of the kind it had included within its INDC unless it 
had full confidence that it could achieve that target without additional 
Congressional action.108 
There was much at stake.  Accommodating the U.S. 
constitutional constraints would weaken the international legal 
character of all Parties' mitigation contributions.  But reaching an 
agreement that would a priori exclude U.S. participation was 
unthinkable.  It fell in part to the European Union to push the United 
States to be bound to its target as tightly as possible, while at the 
same time reassuring other progressive Parties that the compromise 
on offer was worth pursuing.  We came to an understanding that a 
compromise could lie in a classic distinction between an obligation of 
result (what Kerry referred to as “Kyoto style” targets),109 and an 
obligation of conduct.  Targets binding as to outcome, as we  
 
 
 
 
 106.  Luke Kemp, US-proofing the Paris Climate Agreement, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y 86 
(2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2016.1176007. 
 107.  Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 102-38, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Oct. 7, 1992), https://www.congress.gov/treaty-docume 
nt/102nd-congress/38/resolution-text. 
 108.  See generally Kemp, supra note 106. 
 109.  Demetri Sevastopulo & Pilita Clark, Paris Climate Deal Will Not be a Legally 
Binding Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79daf872-8894-
11e5-90de-f44762bf9896.html#axzz3zTw0Re5w (noting that John Kerry “stressed there 
were ‘not going to be legally binding reduction targets like Kyoto,’ a reference to the 1997 
Kyoto [P]rotocol”). 
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understood it, were a step too far, as these would require 
Congressional action in a context where the Executive's regulatory 
authority proved insufficient to achieve that target. 
On the other hand, if an obligation of conduct was expressed in 
sufficiently precise terms and connected to the objectives of the 
NDC, this could produce a meaningful and verifiable obligation.  In 
this context, it was very helpful to be able to point to the level of 
effort the Obama Administration had been making in the lead up to 
Paris to achieve its non-binding pledges under the accords agreed to 
in Copenhagen110 and Cancun.111  The European Union could accept 
and sell to others a commitment that would bind a future U.S. 
Administration to do the same—to pursue, if not to achieve, its target. 
The resulting language in Article 4(2) should be read exactly as 
it is written, with the parentheticals I provide for emphasis: 
Each Party shall [is legally bound to] prepare, 
communicate, and maintain successive nationally 
determined mitigation contributions that it intends to 
achieve.  Parties shall [are legally bound to] pursue 
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of 
achieving the objectives of such contributions.112 
These provisions create binding and specific “obligations of 
conduct” requiring each Party to have a mitigation contribution, and 
to take identifiable steps towards achieving that contribution.113 
Article 4(2) does not, on the other hand, convert NDCs into “Kyoto 
style targets,” or obligations of result.114 
 
 110.  Information Provided by Parties to the Convention relating to the Copenhagen 
Accord, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences 
/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-december-2009/statements-and-resources/inform 
ation-provided-by-parties-to-the-convention-relating-to-the-copenhagen-accord (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2019); Letter from Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, to Yvo de 
Boer, Exec. Sec’y, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 28, 2010), 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/unitedstatescpha
ccord_app.1.pdf (containing “the submission of the United States concerning its emissions 
reduction target, in the format set forth in Appendix 1 to the Copenhagen Accord”). 
 111.  Intro to Cancun Agreements, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/ 
process/conferences/the-big-picture/milestones/the-cancun-agreements (last visited Mar. 
23, 2019). 
 112.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(2).  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
WERKSMAN  
362 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:10 
C. How are the Mitigation Contributions Housed? 
Each mitigation contribution will be communicated by each 
Party and recorded by the Secretariat in a public registry.115  Thus, 
the contributions in the registry will not be adopted or ratified by the 
Parties and can be changed by the respective Party without amending 
the Agreement.116  This arrangement reinforces the view that the 
content of the NDCs is not part of the Agreement, and therefore not 
binding on the Party concerned. 
D. How are the Mitigation Contributions Made Operational? 
While Parties are not legally bound to achieve their NDCs, the 
mitigation contributions are nonetheless integral to the operation of 
the Agreement, and essential to achieving its objectives.  They are 
what will be tracked on an individual basis.117  They will be 
aggregated collectively as part of the global stock take to assess 
whether the Parties are on track collectively to reaching the Paris 
goals.118  NDCs must be communicated, updated, or made new every 
five years.119  NDCs should become the key planning tool for inward 
investment, foreign investment and, for eligible Parties, development 
assistance.  They will, under the Paris Agreement, remain nationally 
determined, and obligations of conduct.  Because Parties will update 
them every five years, they should obviate the need for the 
negotiation of any new climate change treaty.  In other words, the 
NDCs are both the means by which the Paris COP succeeded, and 
they will determine whether the Paris Agreement succeeds. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
In retrospect, where does the Paris Agreement and the 
compromises it strikes, leave the role of international law in shaping 
state behavior?  Is this a ground breaking and bold experiment, a 
pragmatic and functional hybrid, a model for other areas of 
multilateral negotiations that need to capture ambition across very 
 
 115.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(12) (“Nationally determined contributions 
communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the 
secretariat.”). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 13(7)(b) (providing that parties shall provide 
“[i]nformation necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its 
nationally determined contribution under Article 4”). 
 118.  Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris 
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, ¶ 99(a)(i).  
 119.  Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(9). 
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diverse Parties?  Or is it an expedient fudge necessary to 
accommodate the constitutional dysfunction of one country and its 
continued reluctance and that of many others to fully embrace the 
need for change? 
Perhaps the Paris Agreement is both.  But I am hopeful that we 
landed upon a unique compromise in which international obligations 
to prepare, communicate, pursue, account for, track, and 
successively, as well as progressively, update targets will, in the 
bright light of regular international attention and in the heat of a 
warming planet, sink deep roots into domestic legal and political 
systems—perhaps more deeply than Kyoto-style targets. 
These roots will need to reach emerging constituencies of 
demand in all major economies, concerned about climate change and 
inspired by the Agreement’s goals and visions: avoiding dangerous 
temperature rise, peaking emissions, and achieving climate neutrality. 
Like any political process, these roots need to be nurtured by the 
belief that it is possible to succeed.  The Paris COP brought that 
belief to the international stage.  The challenge now is to bring it 
home to all of the Agreement's Parties.  
Since these remarks were first made, and following the U.S. 
announcement of its intent to withdraw, more countries have signed 
up to the Paris Agreement, and none have left.120  Support for the 
Agreement, from governments, local authorities, the private sector, 
and civil society—including within the United States, has only grown 
stronger.121  And in December 2018, the first meeting of the parties to 
the Agreement concluded its work on a first edition of the “Paris 
rulebook,” a set of mandatory and non-mandatory instructions that  
will guide, among other things, how the Parties will hold themselves 
transparent and accountable for the commitments they have made 
under the Paris Agreement.122 
 
 
 120.  Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-
agreement.html (noting that Syria and Nicaragua signed recently, leaving the United States 
as the only country that has rejected the Agreement). 
 121.  Robinson Meyer, Most Americans Support Staying in the Paris Agreement, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/05/most-amer 
icans-support-staying-in-the-paris-agreement/528663/. 
 122.  Rebecca Hersher, Nations Agree on Rules to Put Paris Climate Agreement Into 
Action, NPR (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/15/677109487/nations-agree-on-
rules-to-put-paris-climate-agreement-into-action. 
